The Responsibility to Rescue in England and Wales: Challenges and Implications

The omission of any particular individual is normally not criminalized as per the criminal law of England or Wales, subject to instances of special responsibility, contractual responsibility, and the creation of any kind of dangerous instance. It may be said that the jurisdiction of other nations have adopted the common statutory responsibility to rescue. An example of such statutory responsibility is section 63 as mentioned in French Penal Code, which provides a responsibility to rescue in the absence of any type of risk in relation to any specific individual. However, it has not been acknowledged by the English law that any particular individual has any kind of responsibility to help strangers in any situation of danger or peril. This paper shall forward a discussion relating to the fact that whether there should exist any such responsibility in connection to the citizens in England and what may be the challenges in relation to the imposing of such responsibility.

Responsibility or accountability in relation to omissions has been present since a long time. It may be related to a pre-existing responsibility, which may be created between two involved parties. For instance in the case of R v Miller [1983] 2 WLR 539, it has been stated that if a situation arises in which any individual inadvertently and unintentionally generates a small and trifling fire in flat, then that particular individual shall be obligated to take rational and practical steps to extinguish the fire, or to call for assistance and help. There is a special responsibility between children and parents. If any parent omits to rescue their child from drowning shall lead to criminal accountability, because it is supposed and considered that a parent willingly assumes and accepts responsibility to guarantee the security and safety of their child. Other responsibilities may be incidental to contractual obligations. Hence, when any particular individual, who is engaged to ensure the safety of individuals when crossing a railway line, shall be held to be criminally negligent if he forsakes his post.

Initially, the courts were reluctant to levy any kind of accountability due to omissions by individuals. The case of R v Smith (1869) 11 Cox CC 210 should be considered to be an important case concerning omission to act by persons. In this case, a watchman, who was hired by a particular railway corporation, was on a break from his responsibilities, and during the time when the watchman was on his break, an individual was exterminated by an approaching train. It was held that although an omission may establish an action relating to murder, it may be said that there was not any kind of statutory responsibility of the railway to afford and make available a watchman, hence, there may not be any kind of criminal accountability.  However, after a time period of thirty years, a different approach was adopted and accepted by the court relating to similar facts, in the case named R v Pittwood [1902] TLR 37. In this particular case, a gatekeeper, who was hired by a railway service in county of Somerset, carelessly and neglectfully forgot about closing a gate. This negligent act permitted the admission of vehicles towards a railway line when went for lunch. It was found that in spite of the fact that his employment was a private employment, he had made substantial contribution in relation to the ensuing accident, because he opened the gate, and afterwards failed to close the gate. The reasoning that has been utilized by the judges in this particular case may be considered to be problematic and tricky in instituting accountability for omissions. The position of Wright LJ in this case was that the misfeasance of the watchman subsidized the accident, and such reasoning would propose that the opening of gate by the gatekeeper was criminalized, instead of the failure of the gatekeeper to shut the gate. According to John Smith, the decision, forwarded in the aforementioned case, demonstrates the general disinclination and unwillingness of the courts of England to directly mention that any omission may be considered to be criminal, and the judges have stated on several occasions that the efforts to differentiate regarding omissions and acts are unhelpful, unaccommodating and perhaps risky or dangerous.

Parental Responsibility

A recent and contemporary acknowledgement by the ‘House of Lords’ in relation to the fact that a failure or miscarriage to perform an action may lead to criminal accountability, has been established in the case of R v Miller [1983] 2 AC 161. In this specific case, a squatter, who occupied a house, unintentionally fell asleep while he was smoking cigarette. This led to a minor fire, which started on his cushion. Instead of putting out that minor fire, he moved himself into a neighboring room, and over there he again fell asleep, which led to the entire house catching the fire. A suit was filed against the defendant for arson, as per the Criminal Damage Act enforced in the year of 1971. The defendant filed an appeal that was dismissed. It may be recommended that the standards and principles that are provided in the aforementioned case would be most probably applicable in connection to any particular situation where any individual negligently generated a risk or danger, failed to give effect to any steps that may be reasonable and necessary in order to avoid causing damage and harm to others.

Several instances exist regarding which a responsibility to perform action may be levied by the courts that usually results from any contractual responsibility or pre-existing relation. According to Ormerod, regardless of the unwillingness and disinclination of the English criminal law from levying accountability due to omissions, there are several statutes that establish criminal offences regarding a failure to assume a specific act. There are also other statutes, which are construed to levy accountability in relation to a failure to perform action.

Firstly, it may be said that it is a known fact that a parent has a responsibility in relation to his or her child for ensuring that child does not go through any kind of unreasonable and irrational damage regarding safety or health. Therefore, if any parent omits to nourish, maintain or adequately care for his or her child, then that parent shall face criminal ramifications and consequences for the following injury or death. A particular case in relation to the aforementioned instance is R v Gibbins & Proctor (1919) 13 Cr App R 134. In this case, it was ruled by the court that it was so obvious that no authority or analysis was required, and the court upheld the convictions relating to murder of child by the parents because of starvation. After the aforementioned case, the Children and Young Persons Act of the year 1933 was passed that made any negligence in relation to a child, which may possibly result in risk or injury, a criminal offence. In the case of R v Stone & Dobinson [1977] QB 354, it was stated that any conviction relating to murder or manslaughter may ascend if any parent has committed any intentional act or any gross negligence in taking adequate care of his or her child. In the case of R v Hood [2004] 1 Cr App R (S) 73, spousal responsibility was established when the conviction relating to gross negligence manslaughter was upheld by court because the husband was not successful in summoning proper medical attention regarding his ailing wife. Secondly, where a contract exists according to which an individual must perform certain obligations, in such a case any failure to perform such obligation shall lead to criminal accountability. The standard of accountability resulting from any mutual agreement ascended from the judgment forwarded in the case of R v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450. In this case, a woman was held accountable for manslaughter, when she failed to call for medical attention regarding her aunt, who supported the maintenance of both. The decision forwarded proposed that an implied contract relating to mutual benefit was present that may infer a responsibility in connection to the defendant to perform an action. Thirdly, an individual shall be held accountable for omission where a dangerous situation is created that may reasonably and practicably put other individuals at risk. If any particular individual is aware regarding the creation of the risk, then that individual is obligated to avoid the harm. In the case of, Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] 1 QB 439, it was stated that a man was held accountable for unintentionally driving onto a foot of a policeman.

However, it may be said that the essential unfairness and wrongness relating to the kind of statute as discussed above, is that if any private citizen, who is untrained in relation to first aid unlike a doctor, and who offers help during an emergency, might be held legally responsible in connection to his actions. It can be said that the contemporary law is unfair and inconsistent in relation to the best ethical thoughts of the society. On one hand, the citizen is taught and trained to consider for other beings and show love towards another fellow individual, however, if he performs actions as per the teachings, then he might be penalized by that particular society, which proliferates them.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it may be said that the effect of levying such obligation to act to care for others, as discussed above, must be weighed and balanced in an adequate manner. This paper has discussed that whether there should exist any such responsibility in connection to the citizens in England and what may be the challenges in relation to the imposing of such responsibility.

Criminal Damage Act, 1971.

Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] 1 QB 439.

French Penal Code, 1810.

R v Gibbins & Proctor (1919) 13 Cr App R 134.

R v Hood [2004] 1 Cr App R (S) 73.

R v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450.

R v Miller [1983] 2 AC 161.

R v Miller [1983] 2 WLR 539.

R v Pittwood [1902] TLR 37.

R v Smith (1869) 11 Cox CC 210.